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The following is the complete text of the letter, published at the SEC, Marcato Capital Management wrote to Buffalo Wild Wings, dated August 17, 2016.

I edited slighlty for readability on the web.
It is important because it raises questions that can and should be asked of every public franchise system.
James Damian
Chairman, Board of Directors
Buffalo Wild Wings, Inc.
5500 Wayzata Boulevard, Suite 1600
Minneapolis, MN 55416
James,
As you know, investment funds managed by Marcato Capital Management LP ("Marcato") currently own securities representing beneficial ownership of 5.2% of the shares outstanding of Buffalo Wild Wings Inc. (the "Company").
It has been two months since we first sat down with management to begin a private dialogue about opportunities to enhance shareholder value.
Given the Company's lackluster analyst day presentation and observable discontent among shareholders and research analysts, we have determined that it is appropriate at this point to share our perspectives with the investment community.
Along with this letter, we are filing the analysis that we shared with management at our first meeting in June and hope that research analysts as well as current and prospective shareholders will consider this information and express their views on the subject matter.
I should emphasize that we are exceedingly optimistic about the future of Buffalo Wild Wings.
In the crowded and competitive restaurant universe, Buffalo Wild Wings offers an experience that is superior to and highly differentiated from those offered at any of the sports-themed competitors in its markets. The benefits of its national scale, from marketing to purchasing to best practices, will continue to position Buffalo Wild Wings as the preferred destination to experience televised sports outside of the home.
In fact, we think the Company's estimated addressable market of 1,700 units (compared to 1,220 expected by year-end 2016) in the United States and Canada may be far too low and deserves to be revisited.
We also believe, however, that Buffalo Wild Wings must make substantial changes to its business practices if it hopes to reach its full potential both as a company and in terms of shareholder value.
Our initial conversations with management focused on the Company's capital allocation decisions, which we discuss below and detail in our attached analysis.
Following months of engagement with the Company, we have come to appreciate that suboptimal capital allocation behavior is symptomatic of a larger organizational deficiency: a tendency to favor gut feel and thematic proclamations without tangible evidence or appropriate analytical support.
The management team of Buffalo Wild Wings communicates its strategic and financial rationale to the investment community with inveterate avoidance of specificity. The chronic absence of detail around even the most basic of metrics causes us to question whether the right questions are being asked and answered.
We direct this concern not only toward management, but also toward the Board of Directors whose duty is to oversee, evaluate, and incentivize management in such a way as to ensure that the business is run in shareholders' best interests.
We are committed to doing our part to help the business achieve its full potential. We expect that the necessary changes will include the following:
1)
The introduction of fresh talent at both the Board and management levels. The Company must improve its experience and sophistication in areas of restaurant operations, franchise system development, corporate finance, and capital markets. We are confident that the Board would benefit from adding independent directors with operating experience in the restaurant industry, in particular with a franchised restaurant concept. We note that no current director has direct restaurant operating experience outside of the CEO. We would also stress that any changes to the Board should only be made after consultation with interested shareholders, and we would view any unilateral action to change the composition of the Board as a hostile act of entrenchment.
2)
A greater focus on operational excellence within Buffalo Wild Wings' core business. The Company must improve in key operational areas such as food quality, price/value perception, speed of service, technology implementation, food cost optimization, and labor engineering - all areas where it is substantially underperforming its potential, and, that if improved, can drastically help restore the Company's customer value proposition. Efforts to drive "growth" primarily through new unit openings and franchisee acquisitions currently take unwarranted precedence over maximizing same-store sales and restaurant-level margin opportunities at core Buffalo Wild Wings. Over the long-term, neither system growth nor franchisee acquisitions will be able to compensate for a decline in the profitability of the core concept.
3)
Cessation of "emerging brands" growth plans. Buffalo Wild Wings' continued success is not an inevitability; as such, we believe the Company should remain singularly focused on its largest earnings driver rather than placing wild bets, however small, on hit-or-miss "growth drivers"-- particularly those in the highly competitive, non-core, fast casual space. Experiments with new restaurant concepts are distracting management from advancing Buffalo Wild Wings' core brand. At this point in time, any corporate resources, be they personnel, capital, or attention, would be better allocated to addressing the operational improvement opportunities at core Buffalo Wild Wings.
4)
A profound increase in urgency, follow-through, and accountability. A review of past years' earnings reports reveals a number of Company "priorities" that have since dragged on without meaningful progress, the most obvious example being the bungled roll out of table-side order and pay functionality. The commentary in the current period regarding the near-term goals
2

for these programs is the same that it was two and three years ago despite the Company having missed its initial execution objectives. Even now, management is content to highlight the opportunity while very little tangible progress has been achieved. This issue is representative of a much larger issue of management's persistent failure to execute and the Board's failure to hold management accountable.
5)
An audit of managerial decision tools and a reconciliation of business outcomes as compared to forecasts. Despite frequent assurance from management of the use of DCF- and IRR-based forecasts to approve investments such as remodel campaigns, new unit openings, or acquisitions, our experience with retail and restaurant businesses has taught us that those processes can be highly flawed. We take seriously the tendencies of development staff to reverse-engineer projections to achieve a stated hurdle rate or highlight data with a selection bias to support past decisions. The Board must review past capital investments to ensure that outcomes compare favorably with the underwriting process. We recommend starting with an assessment of the Company's large franchisee acquisition in 2015, which based on all available data, has been an unmitigated disaster. That such an obviously misguided decision could be made under the guise of rigorous analysis underscores the weaknesses in the Company's capital allocation processes and need to commit to a disciplined capital allocation program.
The list above speaks to functional changes that will improve business performance.
At a higher level, however, there is an intellectual divide that must also be addressed: there is a glaring deficiency of understanding at the Company in how capital deployment relates to shareholder value creation.
Yesterday's announcement of a $300 million share repurchase authorization further highlights this point.
Management self-identifies its objectives to be those of a "growth company" but does not appear to have a clear sense of what that exactly means or how (and if) achieving this poorly defined "growth" objective is best for shareholders.
Growth in revenue or earnings simply cannot be evaluated without consideration for the capital deployed in the achievement. This basic principle of corporate finance is tragically underappreciated by the current management team.
Instead, management celebrates consolidated revenue growth without discriminating between revenue derived from growth in royalties from franchisee unit development, same-store sales growth (itself a product of tension between higher price and declining traffic), new company-operated unit growth, and the purchase of units from franchisees.
Each of these revenue streams has a radically different margin profile and comes at a radically different capital cost (franchise royalties in particular come at no cost whatsoever).
Most importantly, the income derived from each of these different revenue streams receives a radically different value in the market due to its unique degree of capital intensity and predictability. Management and the Board should be solely focused on growing market value per share, determining which types of revenue growth will best deliver that outcome.
Additionally, management frequently highlights growth in average unit volumes, but fails to acknowledge that this growth has been accompanied by an increase in per unit construction and pre-opening costs from $840K in 2003 to $2.6M in 2015, leading to a significant decline in the returns on invested capital.
We perceive that the pursuit of higher average unit volumes (management's barometer for "growth") has led the Company to deploy ever-greater amounts of capital into larger units tailored to more populous, but also more competitive, and more expensive markets.
Similarly, remodel costs for the current Stadia program are increasing over prior remodel budgets, and the Company has not articulated the basic return on investment methodology that illustrates why the new remodels are attractive, why the current remodel cost is appropriate, or if similar outcomes could be achieved at a lower cost.
Might shareholders and customers alike be better off if capital were instead invested into smaller-format units that, at the expense of lower AUV's, could profitably succeed in smaller, less competitive markets with lower construction and operating costs, producing higher returns on capital?
Management appears to believe that realizing its identity as a "growth" company means delivering EPS growth of 15% or greater. However, even this statement is made without any design as to how that will be achieved.
Beneath the headline, there is no calculus as to how same-store sales, operating margin expansion, franchise vs. company unit growth, franchisee acquisitions, and share repurchases will combine to produce such a result. Just how this earnings goal is achieved, and in particular how much capital is required to achieve it, will dictate the multiple of EPS at which the shares will trade.
This is the vital and missing link between earnings creation and shareholder value creation. The apparent lack of sensitivity to this connection is the primary impediment to shareholders earning an attractive return on their investment in the future.
Unfortunately for shareholders, the easiest growth to come by has been the kind that is BOUGHT, requiring the most capital and offering the lowest returns.
As same-store sales have decelerated and the law of large numbers has made it difficult for new unit additions to sustain historical revenue growth rates, management has turned to buying in franchisees in its pursuit of "growth."
The large franchisee acquisitions in 2015 were telegraphed to investors, under the pretense of being "opportunistic," as helping the Company achieve its goal of growing sales and net income.
At the same time, the Company did not offer any concrete rationale for why this transaction would create more shareholder value than allowing the units instead to be sold to a third party buyer - an outcome that would have retained the existing high-value franchise royalty stream and avoided a major capital outlay at an excessive and unprecedented multiple, and moreover would have avoided the additional cost and distractions of transaction fees, remodel requirements, regional G&A investments, integration risks, and operational complexity.
Despite the Company's refusal to disclose key financial metrics of the transaction, it is clear to us that the acquisitions of 2015 were mistakes and would not be approved today if an appropriate methodology were employed.
This acquisitive behavior is almost certainly reinforced by an incentive compensation system, designed by the Board, that rewards (if not preconditions) management for maximizing absolute growth in revenue dollars, net income dollars, and store openings - all metrics that fail to acknowledge the capital required to achieve these outcomes and whether the returns on that capital investment are appropriate.
In contrast, most other high-performing restaurant companies emphasize metrics more explicitly tied to shareholder value, including operating income (not sales), EPS (not net income), and ROIC and total shareholder return -- all of which are absent from management's incentive compensation design.
We are confident that Buffalo Wild Wings is in a strong position to compete and succeed in the future. However, we believe this opportunity will be squandered if our concerns highlighted here are not addressed with urgency. We look forward to a vigorous discussion of these factors with the Board and management going forward.
Sincerely,
Mick McGuire
CC:
Dale Applequist
Cynthia Davis, Compensation Committee
Michael Johnson, Chairman of Compensation Committee
Warren Mack
Oliver Maggard, Compensation Committee
Jerry Rose
Sally Smith, CEO, President

Franchisees who invest in publicly held companies should have a line of communications with the investors in their system that is uninterrupted by corporate management.

After forty years of successful growth the McDonald's restaurant system hit some potholes in the 1990s. Coincidentally we had just launched Franchise Equity Group and were in a position to monitor the trauma that the second generation of McDonald's managers were inflicting on the system.

After our efforts in the interests of McDonald's franchisees were mentioned in the major media we were contacted by Wall Street analysts and institutional investors. Working with these people was an extraordinary learning experience.

At that time McDonald's had been an NYSE listed company for over thirty years, had a market cap of over $30 Billion, and yet there was an stunning lack of knowledge among investors. Our discussions covered franchisee profitability, the results of an unrealistic growth program intended to impress investors, management's history, franchisee morale, and other basic topics.

Over these past fifteen years I've had the pleasure of assisting many investors in learning about not only McDonald's but the franchised industry in general.

Franchisees in publicly held brands should develop the philosophy that the corporate people (who are temporary employees) don't own the company.

The only significant investors in the brand are franchisees and shareholders - two entities that should be in constant communication.

FAQs About Franchisees Communicating With Investors.

1. Should franchisees attempt to influence the value of the corporate stock?

Absolutely not - If your brand is to be a good opportunity for franchisees it must be healthy at all levels. However, problems develop when management uses short term strategies that might help the share price but damage franchisees. Think about this activity as the education of investors for the long term health of the entire system

2. know my business intimately but don't know much about high finance and Wall Street?

Hey, join the club. I've rarely been asked about a stock price or P/E, ratios. The analysts want to know about commodity costs, minimum wage issues, management changes, remodeling programs, franchisee debt, etc.

3. How will corporate management feel about franchisees chatting with investors?

They won't like it but won't say much. This activity is most effective in those franchise systems where management controls 100% of the information about the franchised side of the business. In those cases they've told investors franchisees are supportive of management's initiatives and there is complete "alignment"between management and franchisees. Of course they want franchisees voiceless.

4. Will I be divulging proprietary information?

If you think you are walking around with a lot of proprietary information you should consider canceling that speech to the local Kiwanis Club. Discerning franchisees would never divulge information that would benefit their competitors.

5. Do Wall Street analysts care about my personal success as a franchisee?

Not so much - But they want to know if the corporate initiatives will be successful and if resistance to management's direction might retard corporate growth. As analysts they understand the franchise model must be a good investment but they
won't fuss over every franchisee's survival. Especially if all they hear is corporate's side of the story.

In summary, most publicly held franchised systems operate with a few corporate people strutting around like they own the brand while the real investors are franchisees and shareholders. In most cases management has been successful in building a towering wall between the true owners of the brand.

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Recently, we've been talking about the different types of buyers we work with and how the buyer market has changed during the past few years; some good and some "to be determined".

In this article, we talk about the private equity group (aka PEG) of buyers and what that means to sellers of smaller privately owned businesses like yours.

There's been a lot of news recently about PEGs, mostly in a political and tax related context (e.g., Mitt Romney's success as a partner with Bain Capital and the income tax rate he pays). We'll stay away from that. That's a whole other discussion!

What is a PEG?

They've been around since the 70s starting as larger, "mega" buyout firms (Bain, etc.)

They are investors who have private funds (a combination of personal funds and investor funds) to invest and are seeking alternative investment opportunities (i.e., privately owned businesses) where financial returns can "beat the market"

They buy companies across all industries and usually want a 100% ownership, or at least a majority ownership (51%) in the companies they buy.

They typically buy mature, established companies - not early-stage or startup businesses.

The goal of the PEG is to improve and grow the company with a goal to "exit" their investment in the next 5-10 years, at which time they return the gains to their investors and "close the fund".

What's this mean to you?

Here's the change that's going on. In the last 3 years, we've talked with numerous nationally based PEGs who are investing in smaller privately owned businesses. A typical investment opportunity is a company with:

  • gross revenues of $2-$20M
  • a stable management team
  • a growing industry and
  • an opportunity to either grow or combine a new opportunity with a similar business they already own.

Specifically, the PEGs we've talked to and met with are interested in businesses we represent in the following markets:

  • Health care services
  • Distribution
  • Food Service.

If you are considering selling your business, especially in one of these industries, we believe that, in the right circumstances, PEGs are a legitimate pool of potential buyers that should be considered.

As we've pointed out, the buyer pool is constantly changing and much more diverse than it was 3 years ago.

Today's business seller needs to be more aware than ever of how the pool is changing and what impact this has on potential sales opportunities.

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Overview:

  • Activists shouldn't have been surprised by the Red Lobster sale to private equity.

  • Darden missed opportunities over time.

  • Some Red Lobster levers for improvement exist.

To any close observer of the ongoing Darden (DRI) conflict as it has unfolded with its opponent activists Barington, and Starboard since late 2013, a Red Lobster sale to private equity was not a shocking outcome.

red lobster.jpeg

Consider:

Private equity has dry powder--unallocated funds-- available that it must put to use to earn a fee.  Golden Gate had owned three restaurant brands and continues to own one, California Pizza Kitchen.

Darden, which was in trouble since at least 2007 trying to hit a 15% EPS model with the mature Red Lobster and Olive Garden restaurant brands, bought a lot of restaurant concepts at high price in 2008-2013, and wound up with a lot of debt. As the rate of casual dining traffic decline fell after the Great Recession, (Darden noted the casual dining overall space traffic fell 18% versus the peak) and core earnings fell, it had both dividends and buyback demands going up at the same time. A true cash flow squeeze resulted.

Darden had remodeled the entire Red Lobster chain by 2013 and needed to get some money out of its investment. (Why it remodeled Red Lobster first versus Olive Garden is a fascinating question.)

Red Lobster had underlying real estate that could be levered to lower the effective Golden Gate purchase price.

The question, is what now to do with Red Lobster? What are the "Lobster Levers"?

On the positive side, the brand ratings are not weak. It ranks roughly in the middle of the pack via the 2014 Brand Keys Customer Loyalty index but near the top of the 2013 Q4 Goldman Sachs Brand Equity Survey. The downside is there are no other national seafood players to steal market share from. Bonefish (Bloomin Brands) (BLMN) is just growing and Joe's (Ignite Restaurant Group) (IRG) has built its own crab niche.

It's not going to work its way out of trouble with more $10 television advertising that it has been pounding way with this week. It's going to have rent to pay. Darden has noted Red Lobster's customer base indexes older and lower income than the most desirable casual dining peers; it's got 706 units in an overbuilt US restaurant space. Keeping the same units and doing the same thing won't solve anything.

But what it can do is the following:

Close some units. Now that it is private and protected from the intense investment community focus on every metric, it can examine its store base. Note that American Realty executed sale leasebacks on 500 of the 706 units. A number of units were excluded for a reason, some were leased, some undesirable to do so.

Red Lobster reached its unit count peak in the US in 1996, at 729 units. It then closed 75 stores over the next four years, to arrive at 654 units in 2000, to then slowly grow again until 2013. The natural US unit cap seems to be much smaller than 700. A privately held company can work this.

With a rather low 9% reported adjusted brand EBITDA, the law of large numbers is there must be a number of units that are in the lower profit quadrant that upon closure, could result in positive cannibalization, and will improve the overall brand average profile.

Test and rebrand. Maybe because it was part of the central heritage of Darden, other than remodeling or wood grilling, there has been no real new concept ideation for years. A self serve Red Lobster lunch platform and Red Lobster/Olive Garden combo stores were tested recently and were a total waste of time and money. Such poor quality tests are indicated of a big concept ideation problem. Too much seafood on the menu and a very low level of alcohol sales are indicative of the problems.

Work international. All of its peers are. Darden just began a brief foray into ex-Canada international and franchising in 2013. As late as 2013! Missing the international opportunity was a great strategic flaw. The US is filled up with restaurants. Can't Red Lobster work internationally, somewhere?

Work franchising, joint and limited partnerships. Darden's problems with franchising went all the way back to a failed franchised venture in the 1970s. Franchising is difficult, well funded and capitalized franchisees have to be found. Darden said they didn't have the expertise. But it can be found. A new management mindset embracing franchising has to be developed. It can work in casual/fine dining: Ruth Chris (RUTH) has had 50% of its stores franchised to solid players forever, and Cheesecake Factory (CAKE) is working franchising and joint venture partnerships to get its international growth jump started. The Cheesecake founder, restaurant operator, David Overton "got it", but not Darden.

Disclosure: I have no positions in any stocks mentioned, and no plans to initiate any positions within the next 72 hours. I wrote this article myself, and it expresses my own opinions. I am not receiving compensation for it. I have no business relationship with any company whose stock is mentioned in this article.

Dennis Monroe writes, in the September 2011 issue of the Franchise Times

"Private equity is back.
In the last year there has been significant funding by private equity for the multi-unit concept world (this has been particularly true with restaurants). In fact, the pace of investment has accelerated.

Some of the more notable recent transactions are:

• Falfurrias Capital Partners' acquisition of Bojangles' Restaurants (July 2011)

• Goldman Sachs' investment in American Apple, the largest Applebee's franchisee with 270 units in 11 states (May 2011)

• Palladium Equity Partners' acquisition of TB Corporation, parent of the Taco Bueno restaurant chain (July 2011)

• Golden Gate Capital's acquisition of California Pizza Kitchen (July 2011)

• Roark Capital Group's acquisition of Corner Bakery Café and Il Fornaio (June 2011) and Arby's (July 2011)."

 

Executive Summary

We’ve updated our 2010 PE and Restaurants article to identify what’s going on in the US restaurant space by private equity (PE) firms. The result: a lot of activity and investments, some high profile failures but just a modest number of apparent successes to date.  This new round of private equity investors should reflect on what the results were in 2005, the last big wave of private equity investing in restaurants.

PE’s often target distressed investments, and this shows up in the results. Failure is not unexpected. Every PE firm is different and has different strategies.

The PE effect on different stakeholders is important to consider. The stakeholders have some common interests, some contradictory: (1) the PE sponsor investor (2) the company operator itself (3) franchisees (4) other stakeholders (employees, creditors, consumers).  

Franchisee unit level reporting is very poor and makes the effect on franchisees difficult to read. Data in general for this topic is very limited.

 

However, our conclusion is: There have been some apparent”successes”, but with the surge of 2011 PE Chapter 11 filings (AKA failure for investors, employees and creditors), “failures” right now outnumber the successes. Most of the class of 2005 acquisitions has failed.

All the recent 2010-2011 acquisitions and many of the 2005-2009 acquisitions are unreadable, still in the works.

 

PE and Restaurants: the model and background

 

The “PE model” was that best practices and synergistic management practices could be introduced, and that companies could build/grow without supercharged Wall Street/investment community pressure. That premise is still being tested.

The restaurant space had two big waves of PE acquisitions in 2005-2006 and 2010-2011. Since 2005, we’ve seen almost $21 billion in transactions, and we count seventy plus major chain restaurant brands PE owned. This count exceeds the 53 publicly held/traded US chain restaurants as of October, 2011.

 

Proxies for Bankruptcy and Distress:

 

Of the 56 PE transactions since January 1, 2005, nine concepts have filed Chapter 11 and two have announced technical default, one has had a sure investor’s loss. By transaction timing, many of the 2005 transactions have failed.

Chapter 11s: Charlie Brown’s, Unos, Barnhill Buffet, Perkins/Marie Calendars’, Claim Jumper, Real Mex, Sbarro’s, Friendly’s and Bugaboo Creek. Average EV/EBITDA multiple of 7.4 X at acquisition. Five were 2005, two were 2006, and two were 2007 era transactions.

Announced Covenant Breech: Quizno’s, El Pollo Loco. Average EV/EBITDA multiple was 10.8X at acquisition.

Three PE investments sold via management buy out (MBO), that we estimate had to be at a large loss for the PE sponsor: Pacific Equity, Sizzler (9.3X) and Pat N Oscars, and Cheeseburger in Paradise (Outback/Bain parent). Pat N Oscar’s, part of the Sizzler acquisition, was sold by MBO and filed for Chapter 7- liquidation in 2011.

High acquisition price multiple alone does not explain the Chapter 11s or announced default group. Of this group, only Quiznos was a national scope, most were older, regional chains. The average time cycle to Chapter 11 was about 5 years from acquisition. We’d speculate that lack of menu renewal, lack of effective marketing budget size, lack of capital spending and older site locations were factors.

 

Defining Success:

 

Since most privately held company earnings data is not made public, one must gather data wherever possible: debt disclosure, press reports, surveys, bankruptcy filings, resale transactions and the like. Generally, though, growth in chain system sales and number of units can be a proxy for success, as can resale to other PE firms. Chapter 11/7 filings and distressed, near default conditions are badges of failure.

For chain restaurants that franchise, little franchisee specific data is available. This is one of the great financial reporting weaknesses in the restaurant space. Franchisees power the capital and unit development of most franchisors, and represent the effective source of the bulk of the brand valuation.

 

2010-2011 Transactions: Not enough time yet:

 

There have been 20 major restaurant PE transactions in 2010 and through 2011. Two large 2010 acquisitions, Burger King (BKC) and CKR Restaurants (CKR) are still doing quarterly reporting but have shown little trend movement since their acquisitions. Roark Capital acquired Arby’s in 2011, and now owns 11 restaurant brands. Only estimated sales data and unit count data is available, so economics is not discernible yet. Many transactions have just occurred and no trend is possible.  

 

Proxies for Success:

 

National/international brands seem to have done better. Dominos (DPZ) went public in 2004, levered up and levered down, and transitioned through the pizza recession of 2008-2010. DPZ is growing internationally but their US franchisees are struggling or in no growth mode. Dunkin Brands (DNKN) had a successful 2011 IPO and is about to begin issuing quarterly guidance. US Dunkin Donuts franchisee store counts are up.

Bojangles, Logan’s, Papa Murphy’s and Church’s have been resold to other PE firms, with positive press reports of system sales and EBITDA growth.  Dave and Buster’s, Logan’s and Chuy’s are in pre-IPO mode.

While still listed as to be determined, Yard House, Noodles, Moe’s and Corner Bakery are apparently building AUV and unit counts, which have to be good signs.

 

The To be Determined Group:

 

There are some very large chains in the TBD group. Outback Steakhouse Group is the largest group of brands that struggled through the recession and have lost AUV and a modest number of US units.

Burger King (BKC) had a successful 2006 IPO but then ran into global headwinds especially in the US, which resulted in its forced 2010 sale to 3G Capital. Burger King US franchisees have suffered sales/profit declines and are best described in rebuilding mode. And Arby’s has just been acquired and bears watching, as do the three Golden Gate capital brands: Macaroni Grill, On the Border and California Pizza Kitchen.

 

2005-2011 Transaction Summary:

 

Chapter 11 filing: 9

Distressed/covenant breech/ investor loss: 2

To be determined: 36

Pre-IPO status: 3

Resale to other PEs: 2

Positive trend: 3

Completed IPO: 1

Grand total: 56

 

Write us for the detailed spreadsheet: John A. Gordon, Pacific Management Consulting Group, email: [email protected], voice: (619) 379-5561  

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