September 2012 Archives

When compiling a disclosure document, franchisors are faced with an uncomfortable dilemma: disclose too little and risk a costly lawsuit resulting from inadequate disclosure.

The rigorous disclosure requirements enacted by franchise laws in several Canadian provinces have increased the risks of incorrectly drawing the line on disclosure, and even those provinces without specific franchise laws are coming to demand more disclosure and transparency from franchisors.

It would be tempting to advise franchisors to find a balance in their approach to disclosure. In an ideal world, franchisors could reveal just enough information to inform potential franchisees while safeguarding the internal knowledge they have worked so hard to build up.

But such advice would mischaracterize the uncompromising nature of the laws on franchise disclosure. The law has not left a happy medium for franchise disclosure whether or not a provincial franchise statute is in effect.

Material Facts

In Ontario, the Arthur Wishart Act (Franchise Disclosure) leaves no room for a Goldilocks solution to disclosure. The Act plainly states that in addition to a litany of specifically prescribed corporate and financial information, franchisors must also reveal "all material facts" to prospective franchisees, which must be current as of the date disclosure is provided. This range of information will then allow franchisees to make fully informed decisions on whether to pursue a franchise.

The Act's definition of material facts is frustratingly vague and broad in scope.

As defined, "material facts" include: [A]ny information about the business, operations, capital or control of the franchisor or franchisor's associate, or about the franchise system, that would reasonably be expected to have a significant effect on the value or price of the franchise to be granted or the decision to acquire the franchise.

The Ontario courts are still grappling with exactly what sort of information constitutes a material fact, but the consensus is that material facts include a vast scope of information that could potentially impact a franchisee's decision to invest. As a result, franchise lawyers are treading with great caution and taking an extremely broad approach when assisting franchisors in preparing their disclosure documents to ensure compliance with the law.

While the "all material facts" requirement is specific to Ontario, failure to provide pertinent information to franchisees could lead to accusations of misrepresentation in all provinces, whether or not they have specific franchise legislation in place. A franchisor who fails to disclose material facts is largely treated by the courts with the same disdain as a franchisor that deliberately distorts material facts.

Both are considered actionable misrepresentations at common law. So franchisors across the country should take careful note of the obligation to disclose, and how it might conflict with their desire to protect their information.

A further challenge to providing disclosure that meets the requirements of the Act is that a disclosure document must be presented as a single cohesive document. It is now standard procedure for franchisees to be provided with all relevant ancillary documents at the time the disclosure document is provided (all bound together as one document), such as the head-lease between the landlord and the franchisor.

The head-lease is likely to be ripe with material facts that may impact the terms under which the franchisee operates its business on the premises. A recent court case in Ontario upheld that failing to disclose the renewal and expiration terms of a head lease was tantamount to providing the franchisee with no disclosure whatsoever.

Providing the head-lease itself may seem like a safe means of ensuring that these material facts are provided to the franchisee, but it does not ensure that the relevant material facts are provided in the disclosure document itself. In complying with the obligation to disclose all "material facts", a franchisor should conduct a careful review of the head-lease, and the material facts of relevance to the franchisee should be listed clearly as a separate section of the disclosure document.

To the dismay of franchisors who give out disclosure documents, it is now quite common to see entire operations manuals, or extracts from them, disclosed to individuals who have expressed an interest in the franchise system, but have not made any substantive commitment to becoming franchisees. Given the availability of disclosure documents, and the potentially sensitive trade information they contain, franchisors may decide to keep certain information off the public record.

However, the relative ease of bringing an action for inadequate disclosure, at least in Ontario and the other provinces with franchise legislation, should serve as a significant deterrent and a constant reminder of the risks of keeping material facts hidden.

The internet has enhanced the free flow of disclosure documents. To receive a disclosure document, the potential franchisee must generally sign a receipt confirming that the disclosure document was provided and that it will be kept private. In reality, once a disclosure document is provided, it is entirely out of the franchisor's control. In the United States, a network of franchisee-friendly websites and message boards freely distribute franchise disclosure documents and court documents which are uploaded by users.

The spread of such sites to Canada, and the rapid exchange of Canadian disclosure documents, is likely to be imminent. These websites may make franchisors uncomfortable by easing access to potentially sensitive trade information, but the corresponding potential to expose inadequate disclosure on a large scale poses an even greater risk. It is yet to be seen, but the day may come when franchisees and their counsel surf these sites in the hopes of locating an exit strategy.

Even without access to disclosure documents over the internet, anyone with a bit of time and some passing knowledge of the legal system could get a hold of an array of current disclosure documents. Once a disclosure document becomes an issue in a legal proceeding, a copy with be filed with the court and publically available for anyone to read or copy. If a lawsuit proceeds to trial, the disclosure document will have the further exposure of being dissected and analyzed by each party's lawyer and the judge.

At this point, the sensitivity attached to any material facts will be less a priority than ensuring that the disclosure document is compliant with the law.

Confidentiality Orders

Concerns about the sensitivity of disclosure documents are not entirely new, even though the pressure to disclose has been increasing in recent years. When disputes arise between franchisees and franchisors, it is not uncommon for one side to request a confidentiality order from the court, which would seal the information brought forward by the parties and keep it off the public record.

A typical confidentiality order limits access to all documents produced in the proceedings, including the disclosure documents and financial information. Access is limited to the parties' lawyers, the court staff, and potentially one or two experts retained as part of the case. While they are effective in instances where they are granted, confidentiality orders cover only a small fraction of franchise disputes that end up before the courts.

Confidentiality orders are generally reserved for the largest and most complex of franchise disputes, where the court will be scrutinizing every iota of the franchisor's documentation.

The standard for obtaining a confidentiality order is set deliberately high by the courts, and a typical dispute over the adequacy of a franchisor's disclosure document is unlikely to meet the standard necessary to obtain a confidentiality order.

Furthermore, confidentiality orders depend upon the whims of the legal system, and the arguments of counsel. Obtaining a confidentiality order requires a costly motion before the court, and they are never guaranteed.

Franchisors simply cannot count on confidentiality orders to limit access to sensitive information in the event a dispute does end up before the courts.

It is understandable that franchisors do not want to hold an open house with their sensitive and proprietary information. Small compromises seem to have become standard practice, such as disclosing only the table of contents of an operations manual rather than the entire contents of the manual. Despite their understandable reluctance to broaden the scope of disclosure, franchisors must also consider the dire consequences of failing to disclose anything that might be considered a material fact.

A leading Ontario franchise case states that the franchisor has a "rigorous duty to disclose all material facts as well as protect the franchisee from entering into such agreements without having all relevant information".[1] This may be counterintuitive to franchisors, who view franchisees as independent agents making their own investment decisions, but the duty of franchisors to protect franchisees is an integral part of their disclosure obligations.

Any suggestion that material facts were willfully obscured by franchisors will be treated harshly by the courts, and franchisees will continue to have access to a set of drastic remedies.

The free-flow of disclosure documents, and the increasing awareness of franchise lawsuits, will only see increasing pressure on franchisors to disclose. There is no option for franchisors to disclose "just enough" of their material facts, as franchisees, their counsel, and the applicable laws have all established an uncompromising standard for franchise disclosure.

At the end of the day, franchisors must have open and frank discussions with their counsel in determining how best to comply with all of their disclosure obligations.

Franchisors who prepare their disclosure documents without considering these issues and obtaining sound legal advice run the risk of defending lawsuits over their failure to properly meet their disclosure obligations.

[1] 6862829 Canada Limited et al. v. Dollar It Limited et al., [2008] O.J. No. 4687 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) at para. 65.

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Franchise Excellence Research Report

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First up, I need to congratulate Greg and his team. The Franchise Excellence Research Report is clearly the result of a mammoth research effort. In turn, the output has significant implications for profiling, targeting, selecting, supporting, managing and leading franchisees.

The research pulls together dimensions of four key concepts; namely franchisee performance, franchisee satisfaction, franchisee psycho-social factors, and franchisee bio-data (a mixture of franchisee demographics and operating facts). Bottom-line, the report seeks to better understand the drivers of franchisee satisfaction and performance.

Each concept comprises a multitude of variables. As examples:

Franchisee performance gives consideration to financial achievement, customer experience, and the extent to which the franchisee behaves constructively within the network;

Franchisee satisfaction comprises 10 different measures ranging from work satisfaction, and franchisor trustworthiness to intentions to remain;

Franchisee psycho-social attributes comprise 16 variables including, for example, brand passion, pro-activity, sale orientation and vigour; and finally

Franchisee bio-data, ranges from age, gender and education, to franchise tenure, hours of work, literacy and original franchisee motivations.

In total there are more than 45 variables, giving rise to lots of interesting correlations to consider. I also have to acknowledge the considerable work on scales underlying each variable. Not a 5-minute job by any stretch.

The dataset comprised just upward of 1,800 mostly Australian [and a few New Zealand] franchisee responses covering measures of franchisee satisfaction, psycho-social and bio-data factors. These were then matched with circa 1,600 franchisor responses categorising individual franchisee performance, behaviour, and, the likelihood they would be selected again (by the franchisor).

Overall there are over ten separate chapters exploring the impact of one category of variables on another. I have to admit, my appetite was firmly whetted by the half way mark.

With such a large array of concepts, dimensions and variables, I'd describe the report as a data mining exercise - with a focus on identifying and displaying significant relationships.

Three chapters I found particularly interesting include:

Chapter 5: The relationship between psycho-social attributes and performance. Here we find especially interesting correlations between franchisee self-reported measures of brand passion, family & social support, positive outlook, sales orientation and pro-activity on franchisee performance and/or the franchisor's decision to re-select the franchisee in hindsight.

Brand passion, in turn, was interesting because franchisees with low brand passion were, amongst other correlates, less likely to participate in franchise network activities, comply with operational systems, and, promote their businesses locally.

Chapter 9: Impact of background and demographic factors on performance and satisfaction. Here you might be interested to know that male franchisees make more money than women franchisees and are more satisfied with their financial performance.

Meanwhile, female franchisees make better franchisee citizens and are rated higher on measures of constructive participation. In another separate example, we witness the significant and important impact English as a Second Language can have on each aspect of performance.

Chapter 13: How franchisees differ by industry type. Whilst the six industry categories discussed (Retail Food, Retail Service, Retail Product, Mobile Sale, Mobile Service and Business to Business) no doubt roll up a diverse range of businesses, and the data sets were sometimes individually small, there were some very interesting insights.

Many of the insights related to demographic or bio-data like, as examples, the facts:

22% of responding Retail Food franchisees worked more than 60 hours per week, compared to the next highest, Retail Product at 15%.

Mobile Service involved the least at 5%.

Retail Food on average hired 25.2 staff, compared to 9.9 in Retail Product.

Analysis of franchisee psycho-social factors and performance by industry also yielded interesting differences. As examples, brand passion, family & social support, and intrinsic motivation were the top discriminating factors differentiating between high and low performers for retail food.

By contrast, for Mobile Sales, key differentiators were leadership potential, comfort with technology, and intrinsic motivation.

But no finding hit me between the eyes like this one: That is the finding that franchisees with postgraduate university qualifications make significantly less money than franchisees featuring a high school only education. Clearly no franchisor in their right mind would select me.

This isn't a book for the light of wallet. The price is AU$790. However, you do need to expect that given the density of information.

Those deeper thinking Franchise Geeks will get more out of the book, as it does requires some interpretation, consideration and contemplation. Some ideas may also require consultation before application.

Congratulations again to Greg and the team at FRI. With more than 70 charts (often comprising multiple variables), and considerably more analysis to boot, this is a monumental and valuable piece of work.

You can purchase the book here

McDonald's Corporation is ramping up the growth rate of new restaurants in the USA.

We can understand the challenge management faces - they must keep total sales growing to increase corporate income. If same store sales are slowing they have to try to increase sales with new stores. Stores that open below projections still produce incremental income for the corporation.

We've been here before.

Let's review the history of the "Convenience Strategy"

During the 1970s and most of the 1980s McDonald's USA opened 300 to 350 restaurants per year in the USA. In the early 1990s the pace fell to less than 200 per year. Apparently management did not feel this adequately presented McDonald's as a "growth company" to investors.

In 1995 management announced the"Convenience Strategy", a plan to increase new store development. That year they opened 597 free standing restaurants and 533 "satellites" in the USA. The year 1996 saw 542 new stores and 184 satellites in the USA.

The results? Massive cannibalization of existing stores. Not only were sales of existing stores severely impacted but the new stores were missing their projected opening volumes by 30% to 50%. Hundreds of domestic Operators were driven into insolvency and forced out of the system.

You may have seen some of these former Operators holding hand made cardboard signs at busy intersections.

The most important thing to remember about the disastrous Convenience Strategy is at the beginning Operators were thrilled with the prospects and eagerly lined up for the new stores. Who could blame them? They'd just been through a period where new stores were a rarity. How were the Operators to know that McDonald's would be building new stores in all the wrong places?

Fast forward to today, could McDonald's be oversaturating the USA again? Keep in mind that when the Convenience Strategy was announced the USA had less than 10,000 McDonald's locations vs. over 14,000 today. Is there room in the USA for a large number of additional McDonald's stores?

I think most veteran McDonald's Operators would respond in the negative. Low volume stores with high rent factors? No thanks.

So instead of getting excited about new McDonald's stores in their area Operators should be wary about the likely negative impact on existing sales and cash flow.

What should an Operator do if new locations threaten their patch of stores? It's becoming more common for Operators to turn down new stores or not pitch for them in the first place.

In the process of doing so they might attempt to educate the regional decision makers on why the site doesn't make sense.

Yes, there are downsides to turning down new stores, but the risks to your business are much higher today than when McDonald's USA actually was a growth company.

Preemptively Operators might involve their RLC in monitoring new store growth. Individually this might be an opportunity to ask for a review by the Ombudsman before a store opens, not after the damage is done (there is still an Ombudsman isn't there?).

Another avenue is to work with local politicos and keep the location from being permitted in the first place. It's been done before though few of us talk about the back story.

We can't expect McDonald's management to remember, or fear repeating, the biggest blunder in the history of the McDonald's system. I think it's been expunged from corporate memory. There are few people left in McDonald's management who were in positions of influence at the time of the Convenience Strategy.

Since this insane growth was never recognized as a mistake by Oak Brook - history can repeat itself. In fact, the rhetoric is the same, "We need to build there before a competitor builds there". That's the same thing Mike Quinlain said in 1995.

Proposed new McDonald's store near your patch of stores? Be afraid, Be very afraid.

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